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This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with 
incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behaviour to change over time. A 
distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete 
enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and 
reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a 
conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to back the program 
with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, if the cost of using government 
revenues is sufficiently low and the environmental benefits are equal, the regulator will 
prefer to use compensation payments since the total compliance costs as well as the 
inspection costs will be lower. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-
type instruments will be socially beneficial. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade some major European biodiversity policies, such as the 
Habitats and Birds Directives (Council Directives 92/43/EEC and 79/409/EEC)
2
, have 
been in place. The two most relevant instruments used in the EU conservation policy are 
reserves and compensation payments for conservation practices. These instruments are 
often complements but can also be used separately. The policy choice between using 
reserves or compensation payments can be reformulated as selecting to directly regulate 
the activity under scrutiny or to fix transfer prices. As Weitzman (1974) already showed, 
there is a close connection between these two modes of control. In ideal circumstances 
with perfect information, either policy instrument can obtain the same results. In general 
exactly the same information is necessary to name the right prices or to determine the right 
quantities. Unfortunately, policy decisions are never made under perfect circumstances: 
the available knowledge is imperfect and often asymmetrically distributed, outcomes of 
policy actions show elements of randomness and are influenced by stochastic processes, 
and human behaviour is not always rational. 
When the benefits and costs of policies are uncertain due to imperfect information, 
Weitzman (1974) showed that the ideal instrument, which is contingent on the state of the 
world revealed at each time, is infeasible. Therefore he determined the optimal instrument 
under uncertainty as the instrument that maximizes the expected benefits minus the 
expected costs. He found that a quantity instrument should be used if the marginal benefit 
curve is steeper than the marginal cost curve; otherwise, a price instrument should be 
used. This is because the price instrument leads to lower expected costs while the quantity 
instrument implies higher expected benefits. Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) have 
generalised Weitzman’s analysis to fisheries. If the cost function is additively separable in 
                                                
2
 The two directives are designed to create a coherent network of protected areas known as NATURA 2000. 
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stock size and catches, they find that the analysis holds for a schooling fishery (i.e. the fish 
stock size does not influence the cost of fishing), but it might not hold for a search fishery 
(i.e. the fish stock size influences the cost of fishing). 
Besides uncertainty with respect to the costs and benefits associated with 
environmental policies, it is also often uncertain whether firms and individuals will in 
effect comply with the appropriate legislation. Imperfect monitoring and incomplete 
enforcement have proved to be very important factors in the practice of environmental 
regulation. For this reason, Montero (2002) studies whether incomplete enforcement has 
any impact on the choice between price and quantity instruments. If the benefit and cost 
curves are uncertain, he shows that the quantity instrument performs relatively better than 
the price instrument. The reason is that the effective amount of control under the quantity 
instrument is no longer fixed, which makes this instrument come closer to a non-linear 
instrument. 
Turning to conservation policies, Gibson et al. (2005) state that the factors which 
influence the outcome of conservation programs can be divided into four groups: (i) the 
characteristics of the resource, (ii) the characteristics of the group, (iii) the institutional 
arrangement and (iv) the external environment. Based on data collected by International 
Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) network, they find that rule enforcement is a 
necessary condition in order to obtain successful outcomes from local resource 
management. Also the European Commission acknowledges the need for enforcing 
environmental legislation and has recently (February 2007) adopted a proposal for a 
directive relating to the protection of the environment by criminal law. Certain acts, such 
as illegal damage to protected habitats and the trade in endangered species, will thus 
qualify as penal offences, when they are committed in a deliberate fashion or by grave 
negligence, whether it be a case of physical or moral responsibility (Eckstein, 2007). 
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However, in the literature little consideration is given of landholders’ actions once they 
have joined a conservation scheme. Therefore, in our model we allow landowners to 
imperfectly comply with a program’s requirements. The reason behind the imperfect 
compliance is that landholders’ actions cannot be directly observed and these actions can 
only be verified through costly monitoring, resulting in asymmetric information. Data also 
corroborate the assumption that compliance with currently implemented conservation 
schemes is less than perfect. Choe and Fraser (1998 and 1999) mention the available 
evidence on the non-compliance with conservation schemes for the UK. For instance, in 
relation to the Countryside Stewardship Scheme, Land Use Consultants (1995) found that 
on 24 percent of the sites visited, farmers were not fulfilling their contractual obligations. 
Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) discuss compliance with the US program stimulating the 
adoption of on-site resource conservation activities on highly erodible lands. Since the 
inception of the policy, over 11000 producers have been cited for violations on 
approximately 281000 acres with a total of nearly 16 million dollars in denied benefits 
(Claassen, 2000).  
Ellefson et al. (2007) describe the results of a comprehensive assessment of state 
government, forest practice regulatory programs in the US. The programs focus on a wide 
range of forestry practices applied to private forests. The program administrators 
estimated that only in a very few instances forest practices were always being correctly 
applied. Practices such as timber harvesting, roads and trails and chemical application 
practices tended toward more correct application, while cultural, protection and 
administrative practices were more inclined to be sometimes or never correctly applied. 
With respect to the effectiveness of the programs, administrators judged educational and 
technical assistance programs to be most effective in obtaining correct application of 
forestry practices generally, while tax incentive programs were rated least effective. 
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Financial incentive programs were rated slightly more effective than regulatory programs 
(2.81 versus 2.60 on a scale from 1 = least effective to 5 = most effective). 
Previous models considering compliance to conservation programs, such as Choe and 
Fraser (1998 and 1999) and Giannakas and Kaplan (2005), did so in a static framework 
and they focussed on one policy instrument. We, however, explicitly incorporate the 
dynamic aspects of conservation programs into the model and allow landholders’ 
behaviour to change over time. We also make a distinction between initial compliance and 
continuing compliance and focus on the difference in monitoring and enforcing 
compensation schemes or reserves. We find that incomplete enforcement can have a 
significant impact on the selection of conservation instruments. The results suggest that it 
is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared 
to back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, if the cost of 
using government revenues is sufficiently low and if the associated environmental benefits 
are similar, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments over reserve-type 
instruments, since the total compliance costs (cost efficiency) as well as the inspection 
costs will be lower. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type 
instruments will be socially beneficial. 
Section 2 discusses the model and derives the conditions under which landholders 
comply with conservation policies. In section 3 we describe the selection of policy 
instruments under incomplete compliance. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. MODEL 
We analyse a multi-period model with a finite horizon. This policy horizon is 
exogenously determined and is denoted by T. Typically T represents the minimal number 
of years a particular conservation practice must be implemented in order to comply with 
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the regulation; e.g. the number of years a forest cannot be cut down. Landholders are 
subject to a conservation policy, which might be based on a command-and-control 
approach (e.g. reserves) or a market-based approach (e.g. compensation payments). 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
We assume that landholders are risk neutral and that they maximise the net benefit 
from their land. The surface of each site is assumed to be equal to unity. However, the 
same person can own several plots of land. Initially none of these lands have been put to a 
conservation use and no conservation practices are being implemented. The start-up cost 
of changing land use practices in order to enhance biodiversity for landholder i is equal to 
i
I  and continuing compliance costs in later periods equal 
i i
c I≤ . These start-up costs tend 
to be higher than continuing compliance costs because they include learning and 
conversion costs, changes in suppliers or fixed investment costs such as building fences or 
planting trees. These costs of land conversion or of changing management practices vary 
between different landowners: [ ],
i
c c c∈  and ,
i
I I I ∈    with (continuous) density 
functions ( )
i
g c  and ( )
i
h I  and cumulative density functions ( )
i
G c  and ( )
i
H I . We 
assume that these functions are commonly known to both government and landowners, but 
that only the landholders themselves know their real values. Due to these cost differences, 
it is necessary to explicitly distinguish between initial and continuing compliance with 
conservation policies. Previously, Harford (2000) has incorporated the notions of initial 
and continuing compliance in order to determine the quantity of abatement capital a firm 
installs when confronted with pollution standards. 
In order to implement a conservation policy the regulator chooses between two 
instruments: reserves (quantity instrument) and compensation payments (price 
instrument). When reserves are used, this fixes the number of sites that have to take 
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certain conservation measures: q q=  where 0 1q≤ ≤  denotes the percentage of the total 
land area that is sustainably managed. A compensation scheme determines a payment of s  
for each landowner who implements a particular conservation practice in each period. 
The regulator is also responsible for ensuring the landholders’ compliance with the 
policy. To this end, the regulator randomly performs inspections with a probability p in 
each period t. Every audit costs v and this inspection cost is high enough so that full 
compliance is not socially optimal. Further we assume that an inspection can perfectly 
determine the compliance status of the landowner; in other words, there are no 
measurement errors. A violator who is caught in period t has to pay a fine ( )F t . For a 
compensation payment scheme, this fine is equal to the cumulative sum of all subsidies
3
 





F t s s t
=
≡ =∑ . The sanction 
also implies that the violator cannot receive any future subsidies. The fine cannot exceed 
the cumulative subsidy amounts since this would imply less (voluntary) participation by 
the target group
4
. The restitution of all subsidies received so far means that fines are 
increasing in time and thus deterrence is also mounting over time. This increasing penalty 
also implies that not all participants would choose to violate in the last period T even 
tough monitoring is imperfect. When a reserve-type instrument is chosen, the fine is 
exogenously fixed in the legislation and equals ( )F t F= . 
 
                                                
3
 An example where such a penalty scheme is used is the compensation scheme for afforestation on 
agricultural land in Flanders (ABG, 2003). 
4
 A policy with a fine exceeding the cumulative subsidy amounts can always be reformulated as a policy 
with a lower nominal subsidy and a fine equal to the cumulative subsidy amounts. The model can thus be 
viewed as a normalisation. 
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2.2 Compliance with compensation payments 
In this scenario a landholder is faced by a subsidy scheme that offers a payment of s in 
each period t for T periods in return for the implementation of certain conservation 
measures. In each period t, each landowner i is assumed to maximise the expected net 
income 
it
Y  of the land from t until the end of the policy horizon T. In the initial period, 
0t = , an individual will decide whether or not to participate in the conservation program 
by optimising the following objective function: 




i i iz z
Y z Y zY= − +  




Y  is the 




Y  is the expected net income from 
enrolling in the program. We assume that the landholders can only decide to take part in 
the conservation scheme in period 0 and that is impossible to subscribe in a later period. 
The expected net income from taking part in the conservation program will depend on the 
future decisions concerning compliance with the requirements necessary for receiving the 
subsidy payment. In this model, we distinguish the initial decision to participate from 
continuing compliance with the program. Thus we have to examine the compliance 
decision in the last period ( )t T=  and, through backward induction, we can subsequently 
optimise the compliance decision of the landowners in the previous periods and the 
participation decision in period 0.  
In the last period T a landholder who participates in the program decides to comply 
with the requirements if: 
 ( )C NC
i i i




Y  the revenue if the land is sustainably managed and NC
i
Y  the income from the land 
if the conservation measures are not implemented. These revenues are assumed to be 
constant over time and hence we drop the time index
5
. This gives: 
 ( )C NC
i i i
Y Y c pF T− − ≥ −  
The net cost of compliance with the program’s obligations has to exceed the expected fine 










≥ − ≡ ɶ  
If a landholder decides to participate in the conservation program, we find that his 
compliance decision can be described by proposition A. First, however, we define the 










≡ − ∀ɶ  




p p p> > >ɶ ɶ ɶ  for all i, since per 
definition ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 ...F F F T< < < . 
 
Proposition A 
The compliance decision of the landowners who participate in the conservation 
program is described as follows: 
If C NC
i i i i
c Y Y c≤ − ≡ ɶ ,  
then the landholder will comply in each period t, 0 t T< ≤  (case I). 
If ( )C NC
i i i i i
c c c Y Y F T< ≤ ≡ − +ɶɶ ɶ  (case II), and 
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≤ <ɶ ɶ  for 1 t T< ≤ , then the landholder will comply from period t 
onwards until period T and violate before period t 
 c) if 
iT
p p< ɶ , then the landholder will never comply.  
If 
i i
c c> ɶɶ , then the landholder will never comply (case III). 
 
The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A. 
In case I, it is always profitable for the landholders to implement the conservation 
measures even without compensation payments. Indeed the conservation costs ( )
i
c  are 
already covered by the increase in private land revenues (e.g., fewer fertilizers are needed 
or the recreational benefits increase) after implementation ( )C NC
i i
Y Y− . Thus, the 
compliance decisions of these low-cost landowners are independent of the monitoring and 
enforcement policy. Rational landholders in a world with perfect information would 
already have implemented these moneymaking measures. However, in reality due to, for 
instance, incomplete information, these profitable opportunities are not always realised. 
The high-cost landowners in case III will always decide to violate the program’s rules, 
if they choose to participate in it, since the costs of compliance are always higher than the 
highest possible fine that can be imposed, corrected for the change in land revenues. Even 
with perfect monitoring, 1p = , it is not optimal for these landholders to comply. 
The compliance decisions of the medium-cost landowners (case II) depend on the 
monitoring policy. The level of the probability of inspection has to be high enough 
( )
1i
p p≥ ɶ  to convince these landholders to fulfil the program’s requirements during the 
complete time horizon. If the monitoring stringency is not sufficiently high, these 
landowners will only execute the necessary management changes when the product of the 
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inspection frequency and the fine (i.e. the expected sanction) is high enough. Due to the 
increasing fines, landholders decide to comply once the expected penalty exceeds a certain 
threshold. If the probability of detection is lower than 
iT
pɶ , these medium-cost owners will 
never comply with the program if they to decide to participate. 
Once we know the landholders’ compliance decisions after they decide to participate in 
the program, we can derive the conditions under which it is optimal for them to actually 
join the conservation program. We examine the participation decision at 0t =  for each 
case mentioned above. Remember that we assume that the initial compliance cost 
i
I  is 
always higher than the cost 
i
c  for continuing compliance once the program is started. The 
discount rate is equal to δ . The landholder’s participation decision is formally described 





c c≤ ɶ  (case I) or if 
i i i
c c c< ≤ ɶɶ ɶ  and 
1i
p p≥ ɶ  (case IIa), then 
a) if ( )
1
T
C NC t C NC
i i i i i i i
t
I I Y Y s Y Y s cδ
=
≤ ≡ − + + − + −∑ɶ , the landholder will 
participate in the program and will always comply 
b) if 
i i
I I> ɶ , the landholder will not participate in the program 
If
i i i






ɶ ɶ  (case IIb), then 





i i i i
t
I I Y Y s p s pF tδ
−
=
≤ ≡ − + + − −∑
ɶ
ɶɶ  





p Y Y s cδ
−
=
+ − − + −∑
ɶ
ɶ
, the landholder will   
      participate in the program and will comply from period tɶ onwards 
b) if 
i i




c c c< ≤ ɶɶ ɶ  and 
iT
p p< ɶ  (case IIc) or if 
i i
c c> ɶɶ  (case III),   
 then the landholder will not participate in the program. 
 
For cases I and IIa, the landholder opts to participate in the program under condition 
that the initial compliance cost 
i
I  is not too high. If the initial compliance cost is higher 
than the net present value of all future profits from the program ( )i iI I> ɶɶ , the land 
manager will not take part in the conservation scheme, even tough he would implement 
the required land use practices once he would have been enrolled in the program. If the 
landowner would never comply with the program’s obligations (cases III and IIc), he 
would also opt not to take part in it, since the initial compliance cost is even higher than 
the cost of continuing compliance ( )
i i
I c≥ . If the monitoring policy is such that medium-
cost landowners only start complying after a certain time (case IIb), we find that these 
landowners will participate in the conservation program if their initial compliance costs 
are sufficiently low.  
Note that the level of the subsidy s does not influence the parameter 
i
cɶ  and thus the 
number of landowners in case I is fixed. However, the subsidy level s does have an impact 
on the parameter 
i
cɶɶ  via the fine ( )F T . This implies that increasing the level of s allows 
the regulator to shift owners from case III to case II and, depending on the probability of 
detection, more landholders will participate in the program. 
Without monitoring and enforcement, only ‘case I’ landholders would be compelled to 
take part in the conservation scheme, no matter how high the subsidies are. In that case, an 
information campaign would suffice since these landowners always profit from the 
implementation of the conservation measures. So the results suggest that it is useless to 
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design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to back the 
program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. 
Moreover, we find that it is possible to increase participation rates in our model if the 
subsidy in the start-up period is set at a higher level provided that the probability of 
detection is sufficiently high. This would allow the regulator to compensate landowners 
for the higher start-up costs, which is indeed a common characteristic in compensation 
payment schemes in reality. For example, the subsidies for afforestation of agricultural 
lands in Flanders are higher in the first period in order to pay for the costs of planting trees 
(ABG, 2003). 
 
2.3 Compliance with reserves 
When the regulator decides to use reserves (CAC) as a policy instrument, the 
landholders in a particular region are legally obliged to implement certain conservation 
measures. The percentage of plots that need to be sustainably managed is set equal to q . 
The landowners who are targeted by the policy can choose to comply with the rules or not. 
With a probability p landowners are inspected and, when a violation is detected, the 





c . Again it initially costs more to start implementing the required practices than to 
continue compliance with the regulation ( ),
i i
I c i≥ ∀ . 




Landholder i's compliance behaviour when faced with reserve-type regulation can be 





i i i i
I I Y Y pF
p
≤ ≡ − +
−
, then the landholder will always comply (case 1). 
If ˆ
i i
I I>  and ( )1ˆ
1
C NC
i i i i
c c Y Y pF
p
≤ ≡ − +
−
 (case 2), then 





i i i i i i
t
I I p Y Y c p F Iδ
=
 ≤ + − − − + + ∑ , the owner always complies  





i i i i i i
t
I I p Y Y c p F Iδ
=
 > + − − − + + ∑ , the landholder is 
noncompliant until he gets caught and is compliant afterwards 
If ˆ
i i
I I>  and ˆ
i i
c c>  (case 3), then 





i i i i
t
I I p I cδ
=
 ≤ + − − ∑ , the landholder complies in period 0 and is 
in violation afterwards  





i i i i
t
I I p I cδ
=
 > + − − ∑ , the landholder never complies. 
 
The proof of proposition C can be found in appendix B. 
A low-cost landholder (cases 1 and 2a) is always compliant since implementing the 
conservation measures is less costly than paying the expected fine. Medium-cost owners 
(case 2b) will postpone initial compliance until the violation is detected and they are 
forced to incur the initial compliance costs. Afterwards, because continuing compliance 
costs are lower than initial compliance costs, they continue to adopt the mandated 
conservation practices. The second group of medium-cost landowners (case 3a) start by 
complying with the policy in period 0 because they can save paying the expected fine for 
one period (corrected for the change in private land revenues with and without 
conservation). For this group of owners, these expected savings exceed the expected costs 
of having to pay 
i
I  in period 0 rather than later. The high-cost landholders (case 3b) will 
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never comply since they find it less expensive to pay the expected fine(s) than to pay the 
compliance costs. 
 
3. CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The regulator announces the conservation policy at time 0t =  and commits to a 
monitoring and enforcement strategy. The policy instrument that is used is either a 
compensation payment scheme or a reserve. The selection of policy instruments for 
conservation policies has already been extensively studied in various settings (e.g. Sterner, 
2003; Moons and Rousseau, 2007; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 2005; Boyce, 2004 or 
Crepin, 2005). However, the influence of incomplete compliance on the instrument choice 
has not yet been examined in detail for conservation policies
6
. The monitoring and 
enforcement policy is determined by the probability of detection p and the fine F(t). Note 
that the fine is exogenous when the regulator uses reserves, while it is endogenous in the 
case of subsidies. We also assume that the inspection frequency is constant over time. 
The regulator chooses the type and level of the policy instrument that maximises the 
expected benefits minus the expected costs (i.e. expected change in social welfare) 
associated with a particular conservation goal q̂  ( )ˆ0 1q≤ ≤  for a region. This criterion for 
selecting policy instruments is also used in, among others, Weitzman (1974) and Montero 
(2002). We assume that the conservation goal q̂  is the result of the political process, 
which is exogenous to our model. 
In order to be able to compare the two policy instruments, we need some additional 
simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the government only knows the expected 
value of the private revenues from the land with or without conservation measures even 
                                                
6 Studies looking at the choice of policy instruments under incomplete compliance for pollution reduction 
policies include, among others, Montero (2002), Sandmo (2002) and Rousseau and Proost (2005). 
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tough in reality they vary over the sites (Babcock et al., 1997; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 
2005):  
 
C C NC NC
i i
E Y Y and E Y Y i   = = ∀     
Further we assume that ic  is uniformly distributed between [ ],c c  with mass one and, 
equivalently, that iI  is uniformly distributed between ,I I   . The minimal compliance 
cost c  is such that C NCc Y Y> − . This means that the landholders have already 
implemented all profitable measures and no one falls under case I. The maximal initial 
compliance cost I  is smaller than ( )
1
T
C NC t C NC
t
Y Y Y Y cδ
=
− + − −∑  and this implies that 
all landowners falling under case IIa will participate in the conservation program (see 
proposition B). Finally, we assume that the fines are equal for both policy scenarios so as 
to facilitate the comparison between the two instruments: 
 ( )F t F sT t= = ∀  
Since the sanction is now constant over time, case IIb will not be applicable. 
 
3.1 Compensation payments 
In order to attain the policy goal q̂  using subsidies, the regulator will need to 
simultaneously determine the compensation payment s and the probability of detection p 
such that a share q̂  of all landholders participate in the program and comply with its 
requirements. This implies that, using proposition A, 
 ( )ˆC NCY Y psT c q c c− + ≥ + −  
Thus the variables s and p have to fulfill the following conditions in order to reach the 
conservation goal: 
 
( ) ( )ˆ C NCc q c c Y Y
ps
T
+ − − −
≥  and 0 1p≤ ≤  (1) 
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In order to reach the policy goal q̂ , the expected fine psT  has to exceed the compliance 
costs 
i
c  corrected by the change in private land revenues ( )C NCY Y−  for all landholders 
with continuing compliance costs below ( )ˆc q c c+ − . 
 
3.2 Reserve 
If the regulator chooses to use reserves as a policy instrument, the size of the reserve 
equals ( )q̂ q= . Remember that the fine F  in this instance is set equal to the fine ( )sT  
associated with the compensation payment scheme
7
. In order to make all landholders in 
the policy area comply, the monitoring policy has to be sufficiently stringent. From 









We can rewrite this expression as: 
 ( ) ( )C NCp F I I Y Y+ ≥ − −  
The monitoring probability must be such that the expected costs of non-compliance 
exceed the expected costs of compliance (corrected for the change in private land 
revenues). Thus: 
 







Since the probability of inspection cannot exceed one, it is possible that condition (2) 
cannot be satisfied and thus that the policy goal q̂  cannot be reached without increasing 
the fine. 
                                                
7 Fines will be limited in reality because the wealth of individuals and firms is limited (Polinsky and Shavell, 
1991). 
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As an alternative to setting the policy’s objective q  equal to q̂ , it is also conceivable to 
set the policy goal equal to one ( )1q = . This implies that the regulator formally forces all 
landholders in the complete region to adopt certain conservation practices. However, 
through the choice of the monitoring and enforcement strategy, the percentage of owners 
that actually comply can be set equal to q̂ . The probability of detection that achieves this 
goal is determined by equation (1) (for F sT= ) and the violators who are caught should 
not be forced to comply. This policy scenario is in effect an environmental tax scheme 
since landholders can choose to comply or to pay a fine with a certain probability (see 
Sandmo, 2002). Such an environmental tax scheme is likely to be politically infeasible. 
Moreover the credibility of the policy is questionable because the regulator will be 
perceived as accepting non-compliance behaviour from a sizable proportion ( )ˆ1 q−  of the 
landowners. Therefore we do not discuss this policy scenario any further. 
  
3.3 Impact on social welfare 
The expected change in social welfare from the conservation policy consists of the sum 
of (i) the expected environmental benefits, (ii) the landholders’ net income and (iii) the 
social cost of government expenditures. Both policy instruments have a different impact 
on the three components of social welfare.  
Due to the assumptions we make, all participants with the compensation payment 







t C t C t NC
S i i i i i i









∈ = ∈ = ∉ =
∈ =
 
∆ = + − + + − + + 
 
 
+ − − 
 




with iB  the conservation benefit of plot i, ν  the cost of inspecting a landowner, MCPF the 
marginal cost of public funds
8
 and 
( ) ( )ˆ C NC
S
c q c c Y Y
p
sT
+ − − −
≡ . Note that none of the 
landholders will have to pay a fine since all program participants ( )i P∈  comply in this 
scenario. It is, however, still necessary to inspect them on a regular basis because 
otherwise they would start violating the program’s obligations. 







t C t C t NC
R i i i i i i









∈ = ∈ = ∉ =
∈ =
 



















 and all landholders that are subject to the regulation 
belong to the subgroup R ( )i R∈ . The monitoring policy is set so that all landholders in R 
fall under case I (in proposition C). Under the assumptions we made the probability of 
detection associated with a reserve policy will exceed the inspection frequency related to a 
subsidy scheme ( )
R S
p p≥ , since it also has to deter high-cost owners from violating the 
regulation. The monitoring and enforcement strategy associated with compensation 
payments has to deter only the landholders with low compliance costs 
                                                
8
 The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) measures the distortions caused by the collection of tax revenue 
that is spend on public goods that do not influence private consumption. Each euro of collected taxes leads 
to a direct cost for the taxpayers (that one euro) as well as an indirect cost due to the less efficient 
functioning of the economy. After all, the transfer from taxpayers to government alters the consumption and 




c c c q c c∈ + −   . Again no fines are paid by the landholders because the 
monitoring strategy is such that all owners comply. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The impact on social welfare by the conservation policy consists of three parts: (i) the 
impact on the environment, (ii) the effect on the landholders’ income and (iii) the change 
in the regulator’s budget. Compensation payment schemes and reserves each have a 
different impact on the three welfare components.  
The effect on environmental quality depends on the variation in conservation benefits 
over the different sites. For this reason, we cannot draw any general conclusions about the 
relative effect of both instruments. If the regulator knows which plots are likely to provide 
higher conservation benefits, reserve schemes can be targeted toward those plots. This 
would imply that reserves can yield a higher environmental benefit than compensation 
payments. The use of reserves in settings with high conservation benefits is indeed 
something we observe in reality. In a situation where a failure to act has irreversible 
consequences (e.g. a particular species of bird becomes extinct) or where conservation is 
incompatible with human actions (e.g. the conservation of biodiversity hotspots or 
wilderness areas), reserves are probably the most appropriate instrument to use. 
Compensation schemes can be used, for instance, to stimulate conservations actions in an 
established agricultural landscape (e.g. to promote the planting of hedgerows or the 
creation of pools). In order to keep the analysis tractable, we, however, assume that the 
conservation benefits are equal across the land: 
 
i
B B i≡ ∀  
This implies that both policies have exactly the same effect on the environmental quality 
since they both reach the target q̂  and hence the first terms of equations (3) and (4) are 
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equal. The same situation would hold true if there is no information on the individual 
environmental benefits but only on the distribution of conservation benefits. The regulator 
would then assign the same expected benefit to conservation measures for each plot in the 
region: ( ) ;
i
E B B i≡ ∀ . 
Total landholders’ revenues under a compensation payment scheme will always be 
larger than under a reserve scheme. Firstly, the landowners are compensated – at least in 
part – for the conservation costs and, secondly, only the lowest cost landholders will 
participate in the program since compensation schemes are cost efficient while reserve 
schemes are not. This implies that the sum of the second and third terms in equation (3) 
will always exceed the sum of the second and third terms in equation (4). 
In order to rank the two policy instruments, we also need to consider their impact on 

















−∑∑ . The compensation scheme will cost the regulator more than a reserve 
policy if ( )
R S
s p pν> − . This condition is always fulfilled if s ν>  since 
R S
p p−  is 
always positive and smaller than one. 
Depending on the cost of government resources, we distinguish two cases. If the 
compensation payments are costless transfers ( )1MCPF = , a compensation scheme will 
always result in a higher level of social welfare than the use of reserves, since the total 
compliance costs (cost efficiency) as well as the inspection costs will be lower. In the 
second case, government funds are costly to use ( )1MCPF >  because they are financed 
by distortionary taxes. Then the regulator will still prefer to use compensation payments if 
the marginal cost of public funds is sufficiently low. For a high MCPF, the use of reserves 
will become socially beneficial.  
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper shows that incomplete enforcement has great significance in the regulator’s 
choice between compensation schemes and reserve-type instruments. Compliance with 
regulations cannot be guaranteed without effort from the regulator and this has 
implications for the government budget. We show that is pointless to develop conservation 
policies if they are not complemented with a monitoring and enforcement strategy. If there 
is no information on the conservation benefits associated with each plot or if these benefits 
are equal across the region, the regulator will weigh the efficiency and enforcement 
benefits of compensation schemes with the costs of using government resources to pay the 
compensation payments. The results indicate that the regulator will prefer compensation 
schemes if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, since the total 
compliance costs as well as the inspection costs will be lower. If the use of government 
funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be welfare improving.  
Obviously other considerations besides enforcement should be taken into account when 
modelling the instrument choice of the regulator. However, this is not the main focus of 
this paper. The current model could be extended by explicitly specifying the distribution 
and variation of conservation benefits over space and time. If the regulator knows which 
lands provide higher conservation benefits, reserve-type instruments have an additional 
benefit compared to compensation schemes since the former can be targeted towards these 
high-benefit sites. It would also be desirable to consider additional enforcement strategies. 
One possibility would be to allow fines to increase with the size of the violation. Another 
would be to allow learning from the part of the regulator and allow the regulator to adapt 
its monitoring and enforcement strategy over time in response to new information with 
respect to the landowners’ compliance costs. Finally it is also important to note that in this 
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model we assume that the costs of monitoring and enforcement are equal for both 
instruments. In reality this is not likely to be true. 
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APPENDIX A: Proof of proposition A 
We take as given that the landholders participate in the conservation program and 
investigate their continuing compliance decisions, using backward induction. A landholder 
will comply in period T, if C NC
i i i








≥ −  (5) 
If C NC
i i i
c Y Y≤ − , condition (5) is always fulfilled and these landholders comply in period 
T. Looking at their decision in period T-1, we find that these landholders comply if: 
 ( )1C NC
i i i
Y s c Y s ps T+ − ≥ + − −  
The decision in period T is not relevant for the compliance decision in T-1 since it is 
independent from it. Since C NC
i i i
c Y Y≤ − , these low-cost landholders will always comply 
once they participate in the program. The same reasoning can be applied to periods 
1t T< − . This proves case I. 
If C NC
i i i
c Y Y sT> − + , condition (5) never holds, since 1p ≤  per definition. These 
landholders will violate the regulation in period T. Since ( ) ( ) ( )1 ... 1F T F T F> − > > , 
these high-cost owners will always violate the program’s requirements. This proves case 
III. 
If C NC C NC
i i i i i
Y Y c Y Y sT− < ≤ − + , condition (5) holds and the landholders comply in 








≥ − ≡ ɶ  









≥ − ≡ ɶ  













≤ <ɶ ɶ  for 1 t T< ≤ , then the landholder will comply from period t onwards 
until period T 
c) if 
iT
p p< ɶ , then the landholder will never comply.  
This proves cases IIa, IIb and IIc. 
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APPENDIX B: Proof of proposition C 
We look at the compliance decisions of landholders when they are confronted with a 
reserve-type regulation. Again we use backward induction. 
In the last policy period T, we distinguish two cases: (i) the landholder has invested I 
(forced or voluntary) in a previous period and (ii) the landholder has in past never 
complied with the regulation and his violation has not been detected. 
For (i), the owner will comply in period T if: 
 ( )C NC
i i i i









Else the landholder will violate the regulation in period T. 
For (ii), the owner will initially comply in period T if 
 ( )C NC
i i i i
Y I Y p F I− ≥ − +  or if ( )1 ˆ
1
C NC
i i i i
I Y Y pF I
p
≤ − + ≡
−
 (7) 
Else the landholder will violate the regulation in period T. 
The compliance decision in period 0 can be described for three cases. Note that if 
condition (7) is true this also implies that equation (6) holds (since 
i i
c I< ), while the 
reverse does automatically not hold true. 
Case 1: conditions (6) and (7) both hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
 






i i i i
t
T
t tNC t C NC
i i i i i i
t
Y I Y c





 − + − ≥ 




This condition is always satisfied for this case. Thus these owners will always comply 
with the regulation (in all periods). 
Case 2: condition (6) holds and condition (7) does not hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
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i i i i
t
T
t tNC t C NC
i i i i i i
t
Y I Y c





 − + − ≥ 









i i i i i i
t
I I p Y Y c p F Iδ
=
 ≤ + − − − + + ∑ , the landholder always complies. 





i i i i i i
t
I I p Y Y c p F Iδ
=
 > + − − − + + ∑ , the landholder is noncompliant until 
he gets caught and is compliant afterwards since condition (6) holds. 
Case 3: conditions (6) and (7) both don’t hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
 
( )






i i i i
t
T
t tNC t C NC
i i i i i i
t
Y I Y p F c





 − + − + ≥ 









i i i i
t
I I p I cδ
=
 ≤ + − − ∑ , the landholder complies in period 0 and is in 





i i i i
t
I I p I cδ
=
 > + − − ∑ , the landholder never voluntarily 
complies. Only if the violator is caught and forced to comply, he will incur compliance 
costs for that period. 
This proves proposition C. 
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